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Bitcoin has long been touted as a currency and a payment system that relies
on cryptography and mathematics rather than trust. But is Bitcoin really trustless? And if so, would that be a good thing? This article undertakes a critical deconstruction of Bitcoin and the blockchain, their themes of democracy and transparency, and the idea that they are trustless. The article then proposes a new
conceptualization of the role of trust in business and contracting: the bridging
model, which allows for a more nuanced understanding of the interplay between
enforcement and trust in contract formation. The bridging model is applied first
to traditional banking, to illustrate and analyze the enforcement mechanisms underpinning the U.S. dollar as currency and the banking system as a whole, and to
demonstrate that the enforcement mechanisms (government backing and regulation) are not as robust as generally believed. The bridging model is then applied
to Bitcoin, to show not only that the system requires more trust than is generally
understood, but also that both currency and payment systems benefit from the involvement of trusted intermediaries in response to problems and crises.
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INTRODUCTION
In 2008, the world realized that trillions of dollars were gone. Individual
homeowners had taken on outsized home mortgages, and those mortgages were
bundled and sold—as were derivative products based on those mortgages—to,
well, everyone. The feeding frenzy of buyers who couldn’t get enough of these
doomed assets has been well documented in books,1 movies,2 and the popular
press.3
1

See generally, e.g., ALAN S. BLINDER, AFTER THE MUSIC STOPPED: THE FINANCIAL CRISIS,
THE RESPONSE, AND THE WORK AHEAD (2013); KEITH GESSEN, DIARY OF A VERY BAD YEAR:
INTERVIEWS WITH AN ANONYMOUS HEDGE FUND MANAGER (2010); NEIL IRWIN, THE
ALCHEMISTS: THREE CENTRAL BANKERS AND A WORLD ON FIRE (2014); MICHAEL LEWIS, THE
BIG SHORT: INSIDE THE DOOMSDAY MACHINE (2010); ROGER LOWENSTEIN, THE END OF
WALL STREET (2010); HENRY M. PAULSON, JR., ON THE BRINK: INSIDE THE RACE TO STOP THE
COLLAPSE OF THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM (2010); RAGHURAM G. RAJAN, FAULT LINES:
HOW HIDDEN FRACTURES STILL THREATEN THE WORLD ECONOMY (2010); ANDREW ROSS
SORKIN, TOO BIG TO FAIL: INSIDE THE BATTLE TO SAVE WALL STREET (2009).
2

See generally, e.g., THE BIG SHORT (Plan B Pictures 2015) (based on the book of the same
name by Michael Lewis, supra note 1); INSIDE JOB (Sony Pictures Classics 2010).
3
See generally, e.g., Jed S. Rakoff, The Financial Crisis: Why Have No High-Level Executives Been Prosecuted?, 61 N.Y. REV. BOOKS, no. 1, Jan. 9, 2014, http://www.nybo
oks.com/articles/2014/01/09/financial-crisis-why-no-executive-prosecutions/ [https://perm
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It turned out that the houses were overvalued, the homeowners couldn’t
pay, and as a result, the mountains of financial products that had been built on
the backs of those mortgages were worthless.4 Tears need not be shed, perhaps,
for the hedge funds and speculators who went broke, but the unfairness of ordinary people’s money market accounts and pension funds being thoughtlessly
invested in these and other complex derivative products is infuriating.
The indignities continued: Taxpayer dollars were used to bail out banks,
securities firms, mutual funds, and insurance companies—private, for-profit
companies which had never before been entitled to government support.5 Lehman Brothers was allowed to fail while other firms weren’t, and no one understood how the lines were being drawn.6 As foreclosure rates spiked, some
bankers used those government bailout funds to pay themselves huge bonuses.7
Against this backdrop came Bitcoin.8 Introduced quietly in late 2008 to a
very small group of computer programmers, Bitcoin promised to be a currency
and an entire payment system that bypassed bankers altogether, allowing people the freedom to trade reliable units of currency directly and immediately between themselves, without having to trust anyone on Wall Street or in Washington.9
With a zeal bordering on the religious, Bitcoin advocates trumpeted the
trustlessness of Bitcoin.10 A financial system without intermediaries meant no
lying and no one to make mistakes. Instead, a democratic, transparent system
a.cc/L7LX-F2ZE]; James B. Stewart, Eight Days: The Battle to Save the American Financial
System, NEW YORKER, Sept. 21, 2009, at 58; The Origins of the Financial Crisis: Crash
Course, ECONOMIST, Sept. 7, 2013, at 74; 25 People to Blame for the Financial Crisis, TIME,
http://content.time.com/time/specials/packages/completelist/0,29569,1877351,00.html
[https://perma.cc/YPD2-QJY4] (last visited Aug. 30, 2016). The Huffington Post has an entire page devoted to the Financial Crisis. See Financial Crisis, HUFFINGTON POST,
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/news/wall-street/ [https://perma.cc/VLS9-N6UM] (last visited Aug. 30, 2016); see also Manoj Singh, The 2007–08 Financial Crisis in Review,
INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/articles/economics/09/financial-crisis-review.a
sp [https://perma.cc/4LA8-L9Q2] (last visited Aug. 30, 2016).
4
See BEN S. BERNANKE, THE FEDERAL RESERVE AND THE FINANCIAL CRISIS 71 (2013).
5
See generally The Financial Crisis Timeline, FED. RES. BANK ST. LOUIS,
https://www.stlouisfed.org/Financial-Crisis [https://perma.cc/UQK3-MCHT] (last visited
Aug. 30, 2016).
6
See Fed Transcripts: Bernanke Chose to Let Lehman Fail, FORTUNE (Feb. 21, 2014, 7:27
PM), http://fortune.com/2014/02/21/fed-transcripts-bernanke-chose-to-let-lehman-fail [https:
//perma.cc/N8HR-BKE9].
7
Louise Story & Eric Dash, Bankers Reaped Lavish Bonuses During Bailouts, N.Y. TIMES
(July 30, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/31/business/31pay.html?_r=1 [https://per
ma.cc/4M6H-N6SH]; Dan Gerstein, The Bailout Bonus Smackdown, FORBES (Feb. 5, 2009,
12:01 AM), http://www.forbes.com/2009/02/04/stimulus-obama-daschle-opinions-column
ists_0205_da n_gerstein.html [https://perma.cc/YQB7-NXVU].
8
See generally NATHANIEL POPPER, DIGITAL GOLD: BITCOIN AND THE INSIDE STORY OF THE
MISFITS AND MILLIONAIRES TRYING TO REINVENT MONEY (2015).
9
See generally infra Part I.
10
PAUL VIGNA & MICHAEL J. CASEY, THE AGE OF CRYPTOCURRENCY: HOW BITCOIN AND THE
BLOCKCHAIN ARE CHALLENGING THE GLOBAL ECONOMIC ORDER 70–72 (2015).
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based on mathematical certainty would create a perfectly reliable financial system.
But is Bitcoin really trustless? And if so, is that a good thing?
The innovative contributions of this Article are two-fold. First, this Article
proposes a new model for the conceptualization of trust in business and contract, called the “bridging” model. A new model is needed because existing literature on trust either ignores or oversimplifies the role that enforcement mechanisms play in parties’ decisions to enter into a transaction. The bridging model
allows for a more nuanced understanding of how enforcement and trust combine to allow parties to overcome their reluctance to transact.
Second, this Article applies the bridging model to Bitcoin and blockchain
transactions. The popular Bitcoin narrative suggests that it is an entirely mechanized payment system and currency, requiring no trust by its participants. The
bridging model facilitates a deeper understanding of Bitcoin, however, demonstrating that more trust is required from market participants than the popular
narrative suggests. Moreover, this Article posits that some component of trust
may actually be preferable in currency and payment systems.
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I is a critical deconstruction of
Bitcoin and the blockchain—how they work, their ideological underpinnings,
and the problems they purport to solve. Part II briefly outlines the innovative
potential of the blockchain. Part III summarizes existing social science and legal scholarship on trust, explains why they do not adequately incorporate the
role of enforcement mechanisms, and proposes the bridging model to address
this deficiency. The bridging model is then applied first to traditional banking
in Part IV, which demonstrates that the enforcement mechanisms of government backing and regulation may not be as robust as they are generally assumed to be. In Part V, the bridging model is then applied to Bitcoin and the
blockchain, demonstrating not only that their cryptographic enforcement mechanisms require more trust than people realize, but also that some component of
trust is actually preferable in currency and payment systems.
I.

BITCOIN AND BLOCKCHAIN BASICS

Bitcoin is software that is best understood first as a payment system. The
payment system is run on volunteer computers that are all networked together
over the Internet.11 This is called being “distributed” or “decentralized”; there is
no central processor.12 The Bitcoin payment system transacts units of “currency” also called bitcoins. To provide some clarity, this Article will use capital-B

11

Reuben Grinberg, Bitcoin: An Innovative Alternative Digital Currency, 4 HASTINGS SCI.
& TECH. L.J. 159, 163 (2012).
12
Id. at 162, 180.
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“Bitcoin” to refer to the payment system and the network as a whole, while
lower-case-b “bitcoin” will refer to the units of currency themselves.13
Bitcoin is sometimes referred to as a “virtual currency,” because it exists
only online; it is also sometimes referred to as a “cryptocurrency,” because of
the complex encryption that keeps the information secure.14 Either of these descriptions is fine. Bitcoin is not the only cryptocurrency, but it is the most
popular, with the most name recognition.15 Just as the Kleenex corporate name
is a functional synonym for facial tissues, the Bitcoin name is sometimes used
loosely as a generic name for all virtual currencies. Likewise, “a Kleenex” is a
single unit of tissue, just as “a bitcoin” is a single unit of the virtual currency.
A. Mechanics
The Bitcoin software was written by an anonymous programmer (or group
of programmers), known only by the pseudonym “Satoshi Nakamoto.”16
Nakamoto introduced Bitcoin in a white paper published in 2008.17 Nakamoto
remained engaged in the burgeoning online Bitcoin community for several
years, but disappeared in 2011, with only the vague explanation that he had
moved on to other projects.18 His (or her, or their) identity remains unknown,
but the software lives on.
Individuals who wish to become part of the Bitcoin ecosystem do so by
downloading the freely available Bitcoin software onto their computers and
joining the network.19 By doing so, they volunteer their computer’s processing
power to run the payment system.20 Again, there is no central processor and no
13

While not universal, this distinction in capitalization is becoming the convention. E.g.,
Shawn Bayern, Dynamic Common Law and Technological Change: The Classification of
Bitcoin, 71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. ONLINE 22, 24 n.5 (2014), http://scholarlycom
mons.law.wlu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1001&context=wlulr-online [https://perma.cc
/GS9D-W2FR].
14
Mark Edwin Burge, Apple Pay, Bitcoin, and Consumers: The ABCs of Future Public
Payments Law, 67 HASTINGS L.J. 1469, 1500–02 (2016).
15
See Crypto-Currency Market Capitalizations, COINMARKETCAP, https://coinmarket
cap.com [https://perma.cc/C4RU-SVK6] (last visited Aug. 30, 2016).
16
Grinberg, supra note 11, at 162.
17
SATOSHI NAKAMOTO, BITCOIN: A PEER-TO-PEER ELECTRONIC CASH SYSTEM,
https://bitcoin.org/bitcoin.pdf [https://perma.cc/3KWX-L8FE] (last visited Aug. 30, 2016).
18
Joshua Davis, The Crypto-Currency: Bitcoin and Its Mysterious Inventor, NEW YORKER,
Oct. 10, 2011, at 62. Nakamoto re-emerged only once. Newsweek magazine reported on
March 6, 2014 that it had (incorrectly) identified a California man named Dorian Satoshi
Nakamoto as the creator of Bitcoin. Leah McGrath Goodman, The Face Behind Bitcoin,
NEWSWEEK (Mar. 6, 2014, 6:05 AM), http://www.newsweek.com/2014/03/14/face-behindbitcoin-247957.html [https://perma.cc/8TG2-29VL]. This caused a firestorm of attention on
a demonstrably bewildered and unhappy Mr. Nakamoto, and the real Nakamoto—or someone using his account—resurfaced briefly to post a simple message online: “I am not Dorian
Nakamoto.” VIGNA & CASEY, supra note 10, at 75–76.
19
Grinberg, supra note 11, at 162.
20
Id. at 163.
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specific computer (or set of computers) that are designated as the central hub of
action; the system is powered entirely by a decentralized network of computers.
The Bitcoin payment system keeps a ledger of all bitcoins and their transaction history.21 Each unit of bitcoin currency is unique, and the ledger contains
entries for the date each bitcoin was created, as well as a history of each wallet
(akin to a Bitcoin account) where each bitcoin has ever resided.22 At any moment, the ledger reflects not only the current wallet location of each bitcoin, but
also the complete history of that bitcoin’s ownership.23 This ledger is called the
blockchain.24
A hasty caveat is in order: the blockchain is encrypted, so while it is technically visible to the public, its contents make no sense to humans.25
Transactions on this payment system are bundled together periodically and
processed in batches, called blocks. Each block confirms all the current transactions being processed, while also confirming the validity of the block before
it.26 Because each block confirms the previous block, each new block also
thereby validates the entire blockchain.27 A block is processed simultaneously
yet independently on computers all across the network and is confirmed and
added to the blockchain only once a majority of the computers agree that the
processed block is correct.28 So long as a majority of the network is “honest,”
that is, non-malicious, the blockchain will be accurate.29
The consensus mechanism also makes the blockchain resistant to revision.
In order to change a previous block, a consensus would again have to be
reached. The computers on the network would never go back and redo a previous block, however—the software instructs them to confirm the previous block
and then never look back.30 In order to change a previous transaction, someone
would have to rapidly introduce enough additional computing power to suddenly become a majority of the network. This is functionally impossible—to date,
the Bitcoin network is hundreds of thousands of times bigger than the world’s

21

Jerry Brito et al., Bitcoin Financial Regulation: Securities, Derivatives, Prediction Markets, and Gambling, 16 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 144, 149 (2014).
22
Grinberg, supra note 11, at 162–63; Brito et al., supra note 21, at 150.
23
Brito et al., supra note 21, at 149–50.
24
ANDREAS M. ANTONOPOULOS, MASTERING BITCOIN: UNLOCKING DIGITAL
CRYPTOCURRENCIES 159 (2014); Brito et al., supra note 21, at 149.
25
See Last Bitcoin Blocks, BLOCKR, https://btc.blockr.io/ [https://perma.cc/E4EJ-T7RL] (last
visited Aug. 30, 2016), for a list of recent blocks, and click on each one to see its respective
contents.
26
NAKAMOTO, supra note 17, at 2.
27
ANTONOPOULOS, supra note 24, at 159.
28
NAKAMOTO, supra note 17, at 2.
29
See id.; Grinberg, supra note 11, at 176 n.72.
30
See NAKAMOTO, supra note 17, at 3. But see infra Part V.B.

Fall 2016]

THE BRIDGING MODEL

145

largest supercomputer. The idea that someone could amass enough additional
computational power to become 51 percent of the network is preposterous.31
This inviolability is appealing, but it also prevents error-correction in the
event of mistake or, more commonly, theft by hacking.32
A new block is added to the blockchain about every ten minutes.33 As a
byproduct of this number-crunching, encrypted strings of letters and numbers
are produced, which are the new bitcoins.34 New bitcoins are created at a predetermined rate, with the number of bitcoins produced with each block halving
every few years, so the rate of production slows over time.35 The software is
programmed to stop producing new bitcoins when 21 million have been produced.36 This is expected to happen in about 2140.37 After that, the blockchain
will continue to confirm transactions and verify previous blocks, but it will no
longer produce new bitcoins. The supply of bitcoins is thus relatively stable and
predictable.38
Once generated, a new bitcoin is awarded, lottery-style, to one of the computers on the network.39 This is known as “mining” bitcoins, and it is one of the
incentives for joining the network in the first place.40 Some individuals and
companies make big business of building ever-larger computers to contribute to
the Bitcoin ecosystem—larger computing power increases the odds of winning
the new-bitcoin lottery.41
31

See Jörg Becker et al., Can We Afford Integrity by Proof-of-Work? Scenarios Inspired by
the Bitcoin Currency, in THE ECONOMICS OF INFORMATION SECURITY AND PRIVACY 135, 148
(Rainer Böhme ed., 2013); CAMPBELL R. HARVEY, BITCOIN MYTHS AND FACTS 5 (2014); November 2015, TOP 500, http://top500.org/lists/2015/11 [https://perma.cc/48BH-APU9] (last
visited Aug. 30, 2016).
32
See NAKAMOTO, supra note 17, at 3.
33
ANTONOPOULOS, supra note 24, at 27; Grinberg, supra note 11, at 163 n.16; EDWARD V.
MURPHY ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., BITCOIN: QUESTIONS, ANSWERS, AND ANALYSIS OF
LEGAL ISSUES 6 (2015) (stating transactions can take ten to sixty minutes).
34
ANTONOPOULOS, supra note 24, at 25–26.
35
Grinberg, supra note 11, at 163–64.
36
Id. at 163–64, 178–79. Bitcoin production is logarithmic, so the maximum will be approached but never reached. Id.
37
ANTONOPOULOS, supra note 24, at 2.
38
See generally NAKAMOTO, supra note 17, at 3.
39
ANTONOPOULOS, supra note 24, at 26–27.
40
Transaction fees are also paid to processing computers; once the maximum number of
bitcoins has been reached, transaction fees will be the only financial incentive for joining the
network. Grinberg, supra note 11, at 165; Becker et al., supra note 31, at 138; The Trust Machine: The Promise of the Blockchain, ECONOMIST, Oct. 31, 2015, at 13 [hereinafter Trust
Machine]; MURPHY, supra note 33, at 6; NAKAMOTO, supra note 17, at 4.
41
See VIGNA & CASEY, supra note 10, at 138–46; Grinberg, supra note 11, at 167, 181 n.90
(discussing “mining collectives”). Bitcoin miners’ computing power is measured in “hashes,” that is, how many hashing calculations can be performed in a second. One mining company, CoinTerra, has enough computers in its Salt Lake City location to make nearly four
thousand trillion calculations per second. See VIGNA & CASEY, supra note 10, at 143–44.
Some mining operations are based in cold climates like Iceland simply to help keep the mining computers from overheating. Id. at 142.
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The lottery system, based on processing power rather than a one-computerone-ticket system, has been criticized as being undemocratic because those
with more resources to build faster computers increase their odds of mining
bitcoins.42 The system has also been criticized for disproportionately awarding
early adopters who participated in a smaller network when bitcoins were being
produced at a faster rate.43
The network is now so large that an individual user is unlikely to mine a
bitcoin in a meaningful timeframe. The rate of bitcoin production slowed—by
half—in July 2016.44 Someone wishing to obtain bitcoins but unwilling to play
the lottery can purchase them, either in person or online, at a digital currency
exchange.45
Bitcoins are famous for their price volatility.46 In their brief time on earth,
bitcoins have been valued at fractions of a penny, $1,388 apiece, and everything in between.47 So, what’s a bitcoin actually worth?48 Put bluntly, a bitcoin
is worth what someone will pay for it. This is true of everything, even things
that are electronic and nerdy.49
B. Recordkeeping and Double-Spending
The blockchain’s recordkeeping goes beyond that kept by banks on behalf
of their customers. Banks track specific debits and credits (including exact
payment amounts, dates, and some counterparty identifying information), as

42

See VIGNA & CASEY, supra note 10, at 138–44.
See Grinberg, supra note 11, at 163–67.
44
Margie Smithurst, Bitcoin’s ‘Halving’ and the Future of the Cryptocurrency, ABC NEWS
(July 12, 2016, 11:25 PM), http://www.abc.net.au/news/2016-07-13/bitcoin's-'halving'-andthe-future-of-the/7626260 [https://perma.cc/E6LS-M23Q].
45
See Grinberg, supra note 11, at 167; see also infra Part I.D.
46
See Grinberg, supra note 11, at 164.
47
See
What
is
the
Highest
Price
Paid
for
a
Bitcoin?
QUORA,
https://www.quora.com/unanswered/What-is-the-highest-price-paid-for-a-bitcoin [https://per
ma.cc/5EJ7-HETT] (last visited Aug. 30, 2016) (A sheepish anonymous post admitted paying 83,333 rupees, or $1,388, for a bitcoin, even though “The exchange price was around
$1100 at that time, and this was the best buy [the buyer] could get at that time in India.”).
See generally Bitcoin Price Index Chart, COINDESK, www.coindesk.com/price/
[https://perma.cc/7S7B-G97Z] (last visited Aug. 30, 2016) (providing present and historical
bitcoin prices). The first purchase price of a bitcoin, in 2009, was based on the amount of
electricity it took to generate one: one dollar bought about 1,000 bitcoins. POPPER, supra
note 8, at 38.
48
See CoinDesk.com for current and historical bitcoin prices. COINDESK.COM,
http://www.coindesk.com [https://perma.cc/GMC8-7QRK] (last visited Aug. 30, 2016).
49
I can’t understand why anyone would pay $140 million for a Jackson Pollock painting,
but apparently someone wanted to. Carol Vogel, A Pollock Is Sold, Possibly for a Record
Price, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 2, 2006), http://www.nytimes.com/20 06/11/02/arts/design/02drip.h
tml [https://perma.cc/CBV4-R8WY].
43
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well as account balances. Much of this information is reported to a customer in
the form of monthly statements.50
Imagine if, in addition to all this, the bank was also keeping track of the serial number on each bill flowing into and out of an account. Of course, tracking
serial numbers is both impractical and impossible. It’s impractical because dollar bills are fungible, in that one is exactly as useful as any other. There is no
utility in keeping track of which specific dollars were used to pay a restaurant
tab versus those used to buy a magazine—that information just isn’t important
enough to track. Tracking serial numbers is unnecessary, but it’s also impossible; huge numbers of transactions are made electronically, and so there are no
identifiable physical dollars involved.51
With the blockchain, however, every bitcoin is identifiable, and before a
transaction is logged in the ledger, the payment system network has confirmed
not merely an account balance, but also which specific bitcoins are being sent.52
Although this practice would be pointless with dollar bills, it serves two necessary functions with Bitcoin. First, a ledger that identifies the creation of a
unique unit of currency prevents counterfeiting.53 A fake bitcoin cannot be introduced into the ledger from the outside, because the ledger cannot verify its
provenance. Second, the blockchain prevents double-spending, a problem that
dogged previous attempts at creating digital currencies.54
Double-spending is normal and expected in traditional banking practices.
When a bank customer deposits one hundred dollars in a checking or savings
account, the bank will likely then make a loan to another customer with about
ninety of those dollars.55 Doing this means the bank increases the amount of
money in circulation and the size of the economy: one hundred dollars has become one hundred and ninety.
By making this loan, though, the bank has put itself in a somewhat precarious position: if the checking or savings account customer shows up the next
day and wants to withdraw the hundred dollars, the bank is obligated to return
them, even though ninety of them are gone. The bank will have to use ninety
dollars from anther depositor to repay this customer. The bank tracks all of this

50

See FAQs: Bank Account Statements, BANK AM., https://www.bankofamerica.com/depos
its/manage/faq-account-statements.go [https://perma.cc/AB4P-6CVW] (last visited Aug. 30,
2016).
51
In 2012, for example, about 122.8 billion payments were made electronically in the United States. GEOFFREY R. GERDES ET AL., FED. RESERVE SYS., THE 2013 FEDERAL RESERVE
PAYMENTS STUDY 13 (2013). That’s not $122.8 billion in total amount transacted—it’s 122.8
billion different transactions.
52
VIGNA & CASEY, supra note 10, at 123.
53
Ruoke Yang, When Is Bitcoin a Security Under U.S. Securities Law?, 18 J. TECH. L. &
POL’Y 99, 120 (2013).
54
Id.
55
See RICHARD SCOTT CARNELL ET AL., THE LAW OF BANKING AND FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS
40–43 (4th ed. 2009).
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on its private ledgers—using aggregate balances, that is, not debiting specific
customer accounts to repay other customers’ withdrawals.
On a large scale, it is unlikely that all checking and savings account customers will want their deposits back at the same time. A few of them will make
withdrawals, but the bank will usually have enough cash on hand to cover
them. Banks also regularly borrow money from each other overnight to cover
any shortfalls.56
In traditional banking, double-spending maximizes economic resources.
Lumps of money that would otherwise be just sitting in savings accounts are
instead circulated in the form of loans, which stimulate economic growth and
also earn interest for the bank.57
With digital currencies, however, double-spending is a different kind of
problem.58 A unit of digital currency is merely a computer file, and computer
files can typically be duplicated. As players in the book publishing and music
industries know, duplication of digital goods can be problematic.59 For currencies, however, it would be catastrophic; if any participant in the economy can
duplicate units of currency, the result would be hyperinflation and the devaluation of the currency.60 Moreover, no one could be sure they were getting an
original unit of currency, as opposed to a duplicate, which renders every unit of
the currency untrustworthy.
With the blockchain, however, the ledger verifies the authenticity of each
bitcoin as well as its ownership, meaning that a bitcoin can be in only one place
at one time, and once a person has spent it, they can’t spend that same one
again.61
C. Bitcoin’s Themes: Transparency and Democracy
One of the innovations of Bitcoin, both as a payment system and a currency generator, is that it operates without a central processor. This is deliberate.
Bitcoin’s original author was critical of currency and payment systems that required central banks and other trusted financial intermediaries, and Bitcoin was
framed specifically as “an electronic payment system based on cryptographic
proof instead of trust.”62 The blockchain, that automated electronic ledger, thus
operates without any one person or entity hitting a “confirm” button; rather,
networked computers crunch the numbers and once consensus is reached, the
56

Id.
See Becker et al., supra note 31, at 136 (“Widely trusted (but not necessarily trustworthy)
financial institutions handle electronic payments and ensure the integrity of the system’s
global state. In return, they charge society for this service.”).
58
See VIGNA & CASEY, supra note 10, at 123.
59
See R. Joseph Cook, Comment, Bitcoins: Technological Innovation or Emerging Threat?,
30 J. MARSHALL J. INFO. TECH. & PRIVACY L. 535, 563 (2014).
60
See id.
61
See ANTONOPOULOS, supra note 24, at 18; VIGNA & CASEY, supra note 10, at 123.
62
NAKAMOTO, supra note 17, at 1.
57
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blockchain automatically confirms the present transactions as well as verifies
all previous transactions.63
Two themes of Bitcoin philosophy thus emerge: transparency and democracy. Both are nuanced, and they are thrown into relief when comparing the
Bitcoin payment system to traditional banking.
Bitcoin transactions are transparent in that they are published. Transactions
must be processed and published by an open global network of computers.
Contrast this with traditional banks, which publish almost nothing publicly and
share information only with the customer and government regulators.64 Most
individual customers appreciate this, naturally, but it creates a system-wide
opacity, in that citizens simply have to have faith that the banks are keeping accurate records and managing their leverage, capital reserves, and other financial
affairs appropriately. The need for faith is somewhat reduced by the fact that
banks are examined and audited by government regulators, but here too, customers need to trust that the regulators are investigating thoroughly and making
sound judgments.65
Bitcoin again differs from traditional banks when it comes to identifying
transacting parties. Although Bitcoin transactions themselves are published, the
transacting parties are identified only by wallet numbers, and wallets are established without any personal identifying information.66 Thus, the transaction’s
players are unidentified, but the facts of the transaction—its time and amount,
as well as the wallet numbers of the parties—is public.67 This is called being
“pseudonymous,” anonymous but for a pseudonym.68 Contrast Bitcoin’s user
identity shielding with the practice of traditional banks, which are required to
comply with extensive reporting and know-your-customer regulations.69
Bitcoin is also touted as being democratic in two senses.70 First, blockchain
blocks are not confirmed until a majority of the nodes in the network verifies
63

Id. at 3.
See 12 U.S.C. § 3403 (2012).
65
See infra Part IV.B.
66
Grinberg, supra note 11, at 163–64.
67
NAKAMOTO, supra note 17, at 6 (likening this process to the “tape” produced by stock
trades). The FBI maintains that users’ identities can at least sometimes be discerned through
transaction patterns, IP addresses, and other clues. FBI DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE,
BITCOIN VIRTUAL CURRENCY: UNIQUE FEATURES PRESENT DISTINCT CHALLENGES FOR
DETERRING ILLICIT ACTIVITY (Apr. 24 2012), https://www.wired.com/images_blogs/threat
level/2012/05/Bitcoin-FBI.pdf [https://perma.cc/9WSK-JA9V].
68
Julie Andersen Hill, Virtual Currencies & Federal Law, 18 J. CONSUMER & COM. L. 65,
66 (2014).
69
See Catherine Martin Christopher, Whack-A-Mole: Why Prosecuting Digital Currency Exchanges Won’t Stop Online Money Laundering, 18 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1, 6–10 (2014).
70
Bitcoin is not “democratic” as that term applies to a system of national governance. In fact,
Bitcoin is often called “anarchist” because it operates without the consent or support of any
national government. E.g., Alan Feuer, The Bitcoin Ideology, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 14, 2013),
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/12/15/sunday-review/the-bitcoin-ideology.html?_r=0 [https://
perma.cc/43SH-7F4S].
64
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and agrees with the calculations in the block.71 Second, the Bitcoin software is
open-source, and any programmer can review it and suggest changes to the
code. Once the majority adopts an updated version of the code, that version becomes the dominant and governing one.72 This is a popular account of the process, but it glosses over an important step.
A small group of core developers—identifiable humans—has password access to the code.73 They review and evaluate the suggestions made by other
programmers, incorporate what they consider to be the good suggestions, and
promulgate revised versions of the code for network adoption.74 They approve
small changes by fiat, but for larger ones they moderate a public debate about
the utility of the change.75 This bottleneck of human oversight doesn’t fit the
narrative of a central-bank-less currency, which may be why many advocates
avoid discussing it.
Moreover, Bitcoins are only available for purchase from a few sources, for
those users unwilling to wait to win the mining lottery. This also reduces the
democratic nature of Bitcoin—a handful of brokers control access to bitcoins.76
The extreme volatility of the price of bitcoins also prevents low-net-worth or
risk-averse individuals from participating; the primary Bitcoin forum specifically advises against converting savings to bitcoins.77 As a result, only wealthy
people can afford the risk of investing in Bitcoin, which is hardly democratic.78

71

See NAKAMOTO, supra note 17, at 6; see also supra Part I.A. The consensus mechanism
solves what is known as the “Byzantine Generals’ problem.” ANTONOPOULOS, supra note 24,
at 4. The expression comes from a hypothetical situation in which several Byzantine armies
have surrounded a city at night and need to coordinate an attack in order to take the city in
the morning. To reach consensus, envoys of negotiators must be dispatched to the various
different camps, traveling back and forth between camps all night while having no idea what
plans the other envoys are brokering. As the story goes, the sun comes up before a plan has
been agreed to, and the siege is a failure. See, e.g., MELANIE SWAN, BLOCKCHAIN: BLUEPRINT
FOR A NEW ECONOMY 2 (2015). Networked computers, on the other hand, can communicate
with each other near-instantly over the internet, and can certainly reach consensus long before morning.
72
Grinberg, supra note 11, at 175–76, 176 n.71.
73
Id.
74
Id.
75
Id.
76
See generally Bayern, supra note 13.
77
Some Things You Need to Know, BITCOIN, https://bitcoin.org/en/you-need-to-know
[https://perma.cc/N5KR-V22Z] (last visited Aug. 30, 2016):
The price of a bitcoin can unpredictably increase or decrease over a short period of time due to
its young economy, novel nature, and sometimes illiquid markets. Consequently, keeping your
savings with Bitcoin is not recommended at this point. Bitcoin should be seen like a high risk asset, and you should never store money that you cannot afford to lose with Bitcoin. If you receive
payments with Bitcoin, many service providers can convert them to your local currency.
78

David Golumbia, Bitcoin as Politics: Distributed Right-Wing Extremism, in MONEYLAB
READER: AN INTERVENTION IN DIGITAL ECONOMY 117, 124 (2015).
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D. Third-Party Intermediaries
A whole industry has cropped up around Bitcoin. Some merchants accept
bitcoins as payment in exchange for goods and services.79 Individuals can invest in bitcoins either by owning them directly or purchasing derivatives like
futures, options, and swaps.80
Digital wallet providers and digital currency exchanges act as interfaces
between Bitcoin and those who want to be part of the system but lack the computer literacy to participate directly. Like using a stockbroker, these intermediaries make purchases and sales on behalf of a customer, generally holding
bitcoins in their own wallets on the customer’s behalf.81 This means that the individual user doesn’t show up on the blockchain—the intermediary appears on
the blockchain as the wallet owner, and the individual has a contractual relationship with the intermediary regarding the bitcoins.82
The most famous, or infamous, of these intermediaries was Mt. Gox, a digital currency exchange website established in 2010 as a place for winners of the
Bitcoin mining lottery to sell their bitcoins to those who wished to buy them.83
Mt. Gox was tremendously mismanaged by CEO Mark Karpeles; it suffered
numerous hacking scandals, the largest of which drove it into bankruptcy in
2014.84 Mt. Gox held bitcoins on its customers’ behalf, and when Mt. Gox itself
was hacked, the customers’ bitcoins were taken.85 The individual customers did
not appear in the blockchain; rather, Mt. Gox’s wallet did. Of course, because
the blockchain is impersonal and inviolable, a transaction initiated by a hacker
paying bitcoins to himself appears like any other transaction, and it cannot be
reversed.
This critical deconstruction of Bitcoin and its blockchain has already begun
to unpack several of their important ideological underpinnings, namely their
democratic and transparent natures. The bridging model, proposed infra, will
also provide a framework for deeper analysis of another touchstone: Bitcoin’s
supposed trustlessness. Bitcoin proponents assert that Bitcoin is an improvement on traditional banking; this section has begun the discussion of how
79

See, e.g., Jonas Chokun, Who Accepts Bitcoins as Payment? List of Companies, Stores,
Shops, BITCOINVALUES.NET, http://www.bitcoinvalues.net/who-accepts-bitcoins-payment-co
mpanies-stores-take-bitcoins.html [https://perma.cc/RFA6-QS7V] (last visited Aug. 30,
2016).
80
See Written Statement from Houman B. Shadab, Professor of Law, New York Law
School, to Commodity Futures Trading Commission (Oct. 9, 2014), http://www.cftc.gov/
idc/groups/public/@aboutcftc/documents/file/gmac_100914_bitcoin.pdf [https://perma.cc/8P
Q6-S25A].
81
Bayern, supra note 13, at 25.
82
See id. at 25–26.
83
POPPER, supra note 8, at 49–52.
84
Nathaniel Popper & Rachel Abrams, Apparent Theft at Mt. Gox Shakes Bitcoin World,
N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 25, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/25/business/apparent-theft-atmt-gox-shakes-bitcoin-world.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/48HY-UVCN].
85
Id.
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Bitcoin and banking differ, while Part V will analyze in more depth whether
Bitcoin is actually better.
II. THE INNOVATION AND POTENTIAL OF THE BLOCKCHAIN
Bitcoins—the currency—are fun. They’re tech-y, disruptive, and volatile,
all of which is very entertaining. They also provide a potential investment vehicle: buy low, sell high, like any other product. But they’re not a functional currency. First of all, not everyone uses them, so they’re not a useful medium of
exchange.86 Few people even understand them! The infrastructure and education necessary to make them accessible to all is prohibitive. The extreme volatility of the price, combined with irreversible transactions in the event of hacking or theft, means bitcoins aren’t a useful store of value, either. The fixed
supply, plus the inability of bitcoins to be double-spent, mean a lack of flexibility in response to inevitable crises. All of this is bad for a currency.
The true innovation of Bitcoin is its blockchain: the decentralized public
ledger that both verifies and publishes each transaction across the Bitcoin system. “The notion of shared public ledgers may not sound revolutionary or sexy.
Neither did double-entry book-keeping or joint-stock companies. Yet, like
them, the blockchain is an apparently mundane process that has the potential to
transform how people and businesses co-operate.”87
To reiterate a point made above, Bitcoin and blockchain are not synonymous.88 Bitcoin has a blockchain, but there are other blockchains that are not
Bitcoin’s.89 Kleenex makes tissues, but so does Puff’s, Magic Soft, Green Forest, and others. To name a few examples as of this writing, IBM, Visa, and a
consortium of private banks are all in some stage of their own blockchain development.90
86

See generally Becker et al., supra note 31; Golumbia, supra note 78; Popper, supra note
8; Brito et al, supra note 21; Max I. Raskin, Note, Realm of the Coin: Bitcoin and Civil Procedure, 20 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 969 (2015); Shadab, supra note 80; see also Jacob
Davidson, No, Big Companies Aren’t Really Accepting Bitcoin, MONEY (Jan. 9, 2015)
http://time.com/money/3658361/dell-microsoft-expedia-bitcoin/ (noting that many companies that purport to accept bitcoins are actually just using payment processing services that
accept bitcoins, and those payment processing services convert bitcoins to U.S. dollars before remitting payment to the companies). For more on the defining characteristics of a currency (medium of exchange, store of value, unit of measure), see infra Part IV.A.
87
Trust Machine, supra note 40.
88
See supra Part I.
89
See Joshua Fairfield, Smart Contracts, Bitcoin Bots, and Consumer Protection, 71 WASH.
& LEE L. REV. ONLINE 35, 37 n.6 (2014), http://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/cgi/viewcon
tent.cgi?article=1003&context=wlulr-online [https://perma.cc/54PZ-3GU2].
90
See, e.g., Jemima Kelly, R3 Blockchain Group Adds Five Banks, Brings in Technology
Heavyweights, REUTERS (Dec. 16, 2015, 7:15 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-glob
al- banks-blockchain-idUSKBN0TZ1MF20151216 [https://perma.cc/4KQV-XJ8L]; Robert
McMillan, IBM Bets on Bitcoin Ledger, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 16, 2016, 12:01 AM), http://
www.wsj.com/articles/ibm-bets-on-bitcoin-ledger-1455598864 [https://perma.cc/ME6N-LQ
8V]; Daniel Palmer, Visa Seeks Developer for ‘Secure, Scalable’ Blockchain Project,
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What exactly these blockchains are trying to accomplish is not entirely
clear. What problem do they solve?91 Some speculation:
Blockchains offer security, in the sense that ownership is verified before a
transaction is initiated; the transaction itself is confirmed by the disinterested,
impersonal network;92 and the transaction is non-reversible. All these features
have some appeal to someone wanting to convey money or property from one
party to another.
Blockchains also offer speed. Assuming it has enough processing power to
handle the number of transactions, a blockchain is capable of near-immediate
settlement.93 Once a transaction has been initiated, the network begins to process it within a matter of minutes, and the transaction is confirmed and completed a few minutes later. Contrast this efficiency with the overnight clearing
generally required by banks, or the potentially days-long process of signing a
deed and having it recorded. Banks and recording offices are also only open on
weekdays from nine to five, whereas a blockchain is available 24/7.
At its most basic, a blockchain is a ledger. Ledgers can keep track of lots of
things, not just bitcoins. Consider property records again. In most of the U.S.,
real property is identified by metes and bounds descriptions or by a lot number,
and then transferred via deeds that are recorded and publicly available. If, instead of identifying property by metes and bounds or by a lot number, each
parcel of real property were represented by a specific bitcoin or similar kind of
digital token,94 buying and selling real property would become a significantly
streamlined process. The blockchain could verify the seller’s ownership of the
parcel, eliminating the need for a title search. Upon receipt of the purchase
price, the seller could direct the digital token to the buyer’s account, and a few
minutes later, the buyer would be confirmed as the new owner.

COINDESK (Mar. 2, 2016, 1:35 PM), http://www.coindesk.com/visa-ad-developer-securescalable-blockchain [https://perm a.cc/N7RV-2WLU].
91
I loved a cartoon I saw recently on Twitter, which showed a group of bank employees
around a conference table. “All our competitor banks have blockchain labs, and I want one,
too!” yells the boss. The employees chime in: “We’ll need some blocksperts!” “And a hipster office!” “And an actual customer problem requiring a blockchain!” Santiago Molins
(@stupidcache), TWITTER (Jan. 25, 2016, 5:06 AM), https://twitter.com/stupidcache/stat
us/691608 174147821569 [https://perma.cc/ZA5S-J9A5].
92
A public blockchain certainly has a disinterested, impersonal network. Vitalik Buterin, On
Public and Private Blockchains, ETHEREUM BLOG (Aug. 7, 2015), https://blog.ethereu
m.org/2015/08/07/on-public-and-private-blockchains [https://perma.cc/M5KZ-22ZP]. Consortium or fully-private blockchains, on the other hand, are maintained by computer nodes
that have been vetted and given permission to join the network. Id.
93
Elliot Maras, Deutsche Bank Explores Outlook for Instant Payments & Blockchain Brings
Options, CRYPTOCOINNEWS (Dec. 14, 2015), https://www.cryptocoinsnews.com/deutschebank-explores-outlook-instant-payments-blockchain-brings-options [https://perma.cc/4VDUTM6L].
94
YONI ASSIA ET AL, COLORED COINS WHITEPAPER, https://docs.google.com/document/d/1A
nkP_cVZTCMLIzw4DvsW6M8Q2JC0lIzrTLuoWu2z1BE/edit#heading=h.wxrvzqj8997r
[https://perma.cc/CRU7-2EL8].
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If this sounds bizarre, consider that it’s exactly the same mechanism as a
traditional recording system: ownership rights over a piece of real property are
written down in some publicly-accessible place, so they can be traced over time
and current ownership can be verified. Admittedly, the most hyped attempt to
put real property records on a blockchain has so far been unsuccessful, but the
potential still exists.95
The ownership or authenticity of other property could also be verified by a
blockchain: artworks, designer handbags, electronic tickets to concerts or sporting events.96
Contractual obligations may also be recordable on a blockchain.97 Many
basic contract provisions can be reduced to computer-programming languages,
because they can be reduced to a series of if-then statements.98 If performance,
then payment. If nonpayment, then default. If default, then remedies.
If tangible property is also connected to the internet, then contractual performance (or nonperformance) on the blockchain can have real-world ramifications. Imagine a leased vehicle with an internet-connected key fob.99 If the lessee fails to make payment, the fob stops working—and the repo man’s key fob
starts working.100 Crazy, huh?
These innovative applications for the blockchain are sometimes referred to
as “blockchain 2.0.”101 If real-world assets can be tracked and transferred on a
blockchain, parties can transfer ownership without an intermediary (like a Recorder of Deeds) verifying the transaction.102
The utility of all this may not be immediately clear; why put property records on a blockchain when we have a functional recording system in place already? A more reliable, faster recording system would always be preferable to
a slow, clunky one, Moreover, blockchain technology, although initially known
for its criminal implications,103 will likely expand into other useful spaces. Sev95

See generally Pete Rizzo, Blockchain Land Title Project ‘Stalls’ in Honduras, COINDESK
(Dec. 26, 2015, 3:31 PM), http://www.coindesk.com/debate-factom-land-title-honduras [htt
ps://perma.cc/G33L-HQBE].
96
See SWAN, supra note 71, at 9–10.
97
See id. at 9.
98
Pioneering work in this area was done by Nick Szabo. See Nick Szabo, The Idea of Smart
Contracts, NICK SZABO’S PAPERS AND CONCISE TUTORIALS (1997), http://szabo.best.vw
h.net/smart_contracts_idea.html [https://perma.cc/V6AZ-7V8W] [hereinafter Smart Contracts]; Nick Szabo, A Formal Language for Analyzing Contracts, NICK SZABO’S PAPER AND
CONCISE TUTORIALS (2002), http://szabo.best.vwh.net/contractlanguage.html [https://perma.c
c/XR6D-BE7G].
99
SZABO, Smart Contracts, supra note 98.
100
See Smart Property, BITCOIN WIKI, https://en.bitcoin.it/wiki/Smart_Property [https://per
ma.cc/8CYY-ZWAB] (last visited Aug. 31, 2016).
101
E.g., SWAN, supra note 71, at 10. Some sources go further. See id. at xv–xvi (distinguishing between Blockchain 2.0 (financial contracts on the blockchain) and Blockchain 3.0 (further applications of smart contracting)).
102
Fairfield, supra note 89, at 38, 41.
103
See Christopher, supra note 69, at 19–20.
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eral sources have likened the blockchain to Napster, the music-sharing service.104 What began as a company with shady overtones turned out to be a pioneering development in peer-to-peer file sharing, a technology that has grown
to encompass other useful applications.
Nakamoto understood at Bitcoin’s inception that the blockchain had additional potential beyond Bitcoin, but many useful applications for the blockchain
are likely in the future.105 This overview of the blockchain’s innovative applications is admittedly cursory, but the blockchain’s potential is only beginning to
be understood.106 Future work should further investigate the utility and viability
of blockchain technology in contracts, as well as the legal and social implications of such applications.
This future work should also consider the enforcement mechanisms inherent in the blockchain and whether they further the social goals and legal doctrines that govern and guide existing contract forms. For instance, if access to a
rented apartment is governed by the blockchain and the tenant defaults on the
rent, the blockchain could conceivably inhibit the tenant’s access to the apartment.107 This may, however, circumvent important bodies of landlord/tenant
law.108 Future work must consider what role a trusted intermediary—including
but not limited to the judiciary—can and should play in an enforcement-based
system to prevent unjust or dangerous results.
III. TRUST
Bitcoin has been touted from its inception as being a “trustless” payment
system and currency, with the unexamined assumption being that a trust-based
system is inherently worse than a trustless one.109 This begs the question of
what role trust does—and should—play in finance, business, contract, and economic activity generally.
Despite the fact that trust has been examined across many social science
disciplines, no uniform or universal definition has emerged. Trust has been defined as “willingness to rely on an exchange partner in whom one has confidence,”110 a generalized “expectancy held by an individual . . . that the word . . .

104

Cook, supra note 59, at 562; Trust Machine, supra note 40.
See NAKAMOTO, supra note 17, at 1 (referencing escrow services).
106
Fairfield, supra note 87, at 38, 41; see e.g., SWAN, supra note 71, at xv–xvi.
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I am grateful to Tracy Hresko Pearl for this hypothetical.
108
Szabo also anticipated that there may be circumstances in which automatic enforcement
may not be desirable: in discussing automatic termination of an auto lease, he pointed out
that “it would be rude to revoke operation of the car while it’s doing 75 down the freeway.”
SZABO, Smart Contracts, supra note 98.
109
NAKAMOTO, supra note 17, at 1.
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J. MARKETING 81, 82 (1993).
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of another . . . can be relied upon,”111 and, in the context of e-business, “general
reliance of business actors and private citizens or consumers on other actors or
systems within the Information Society.”112
What most definitions of trust have in common is the concept of uncertainty.113 If a thing is certain, there is no need for trust because there is only
knowledge that the thing will be. Trust, then, is usually described as a belief in
something despite its uncertainty.114 Definitions of trust often contain not only
words like “uncertainty,” “perceived risk,” and “vulnerability,” but also their
antitheses: words like “confidence,” “reliability,” and “integrity.”115
If defining trust is difficult, measuring it is even more so.116 The published
literature relies primarily on surveys about individuals’ opinions, or on human
behavioral experiments with names like “basic trust game” and “gift exchange
game,” which are variations on the prisoner’s dilemma scenario.117 Huge numbers of variables have been analyzed with regard to whether they contribute to
(or detract from) the strength of a person’s trust. Studies have investigated endogenous factors like the person’s risk tolerance, beliefs about other people’s
trustworthiness, and aversion to feeling betrayed; exogenous factors such as
broader social beliefs, ethno-linguistic homogeneity, and common religion; and
even neurobiological factors that suggest evolutionarily-beneficial explanations
for trusting behavior.118
While trust is usually defined in relation to the trustor’s vulnerability, some
studies also investigate the trustee’s reaction and its consequences. Once a trustor has initiated a trusting behavior, the trustee is in a position to exploit that
trust for his own benefit.119 However, a trustee who takes advantage of trusting

111

Julian B. Rotter, A New Scale for the Measurement of Interpersonal Trust, 35 J.
PERSONALITY 651, 651 (1967).
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Sara Jones et al., Trust Requirements in E-Business, 43 COMM. ASS’N FOR COMPUTING
MACHINERY 81, 83 (2000).
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Deepak Malhotra, Trust and Reciprocity Decisions: The Differing Perspectives of Trustors and Trusted Parties, 94 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 61, 62–
64 (2004); GERARDO A. GUERRA & DANIEL J. ZIZZO, OXFORD INTERNET INST., ECONOMICS OF
TRUST IN THE INFORMATION ECONOMY: ISSUES OF IDENTITY, PRIVACY AND SECURITY 3
(2003).
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See GUERRA & ZIZZO, supra note 113, at 3. For the purposes of this paper, trust is understood as an emotion that, once in existence, causes or permits a party to engage in some behavior. But see, e.g., ERNST FEHR, INST. STUDY LAB., ON THE ECONOMICS AND BIOLOGY OF
TRUST 3 (2008) (conflating the emotion of trust with the trusting behavior it engenders).
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Avinandan Mukherjee & Prithwiraj Nath, Role of Electronic Trust in Online Retailing: A
Re-Examination of the Commitment-Trust Theory, 41 EUR. J. MARKETING 1173, 1177 (2007).
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See FEHR, supra note 114, at 2.
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E.g., MICHAEL BACHARACH ET AL., OXFORD UNIV., DEP’T OF ECON., IS TRUST SELFFULFILLING? AN EXPERIMENTAL STUDY 2–3 (2001); Ernst Fehr & Simon Gächter, Do Incentive Contracts Undermine Voluntary Cooperation? 3 (U. Zurich Inst. Empirical Research in
Econ., Working Paper No. 34, 2002).
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See FEHR, supra note 114, at 2, 15, 21–22.
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BACHARACH ET AL., supra note 117, at 3; GUERRA & ZIZZO, supra note 113, at 2.
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behavior risks punishment from the trustor(s).120 Trustors have even been found
to punish trustees for seeking verification, or otherwise taking away the trust
opportunity.121 On the other hand, some people demonstrate “trust responsiveness,” in that they are more likely to behave in a trustworthy manner once they
realize trust has been placed in them.122 Unsurprisingly, the more sympathy or
respect the trustee has for the trustor, the more trust-responsive the trustee will
be.123
Some social scientists posit that trust is required when there is a lack of legal commitment, suggesting that the absence of a legal enforcement mechanism
causes the very uncertainty that in turn requires trust before the parties enter
into an agreement or exchange.124 For those in the legal field, however, the
mere presence of a public or private law enforcement mechanism may not be
enough. The outcomes of negotiation, litigation, or other dispute resolution
mechanisms are probably still uncertain enough that trust is required before entering into even legally enforceable agreements. Indeed, at least one study has
measured the percentage of law students per capita across countries as a proxy
for lack of trust: large numbers of law students were presumed to signal “problems in the legal enforcement of property rights and contracts in the absence of
effective social norms[.]”125
More broadly, trust plays an important role in economic activity. Trusting
economic actors invest and trade more, expanding the reach of their economic
activity in spite of the uncertainty of their returns or utility.126 Given that a trustee is by nature provided the opportunity to exploit a trustor’s vulnerability, it is
paradoxically necessary for a trustee to decline that self-interested opportunity
in order for an economy to thrive.127
When business takes place solely or primarily online, trust formation is
even more important.128 Without interpersonal interaction and social and cultural norms to aid in evaluating uncertainty, trust formation can be more difficult.129 Moreover, a trustor engaging in purely electronic business activities
must place trust not only in the counterparty but also in the reliability and secu120

See Ernst Fehr & Simon Gächter, Cooperation and Punishment in Public Goods Experiments, 90 AM. ECON. REV. 980, 980 (2000); see also FEHR, supra note 114, at 13 (“Betrayal
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121
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See id. at 22.
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See id. at 23–24.
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1179.
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rity of the counterparty’s information and delivery systems.130 For instance, a
customer’s trust in an online banking system depends on whether the customer
perceives the bank to share the customer’s values, on the bank’s responsiveness
in communicating with the customer, and on the customer’s sense of security
that the bank will not engage in opportunistic behavior.131 Customers particularly demand assurances regarding the privacy and security of their financial
information as an antecedent to trusting behavior.132
The broad availability of electronic information may (at least partially)
compensate for the uncertainty built into a transaction not conducted face-toface.133 Collecting that information may violate privacy, however, resulting in
“trust tension.”134 The “absence of data impedes trust as accountability is limited, but data gathering creates trust problems regarding the use of the data in
question and intrusions on privacy.”135 Another dilemma may be that electronic
information is not itself well-verified; for example, online review systems are
under frequent fire for being unfair.136
A.

Trust Models

The process of establishing trust and the effects of doing so are sometimes
represented in the literature as trust models—either as a kind of flow chart or as
an algebraic expression. The notoriously math-phobic legal academy will no
doubt be daunted by an algebraic expression:
Henceforth we write t for the probability with which the truster R chooses
T[rusting behavior] and f the probability with which the trustee E chooses
F[ulfilling behavior]. We let t* denote E’s estimate of t, f* R’s estimate of f, and
f** E’s estimate of f*. We call f the trustee’s propensity to fulfill, f* the truster’s
confidence, and f** the trustee’s confidence-perception.
Trust responsiveness implies that f increases with f**. But this is not quite
enough to characterize the intuitive notion: we must add the proviso that the
function expresses a causal relation from f** to f; E must be made more ready to
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See, e.g., Jones et al., supra note 112, at 83.
Mukherjee & Nath, supra note 115, at 1178.
132
Id.
133
GUERRA & ZIZZO, supra note 113, at 4.
134
Id. at 5.
135
Id.
136
See generally JENNIFER BROWN & JOHN MORGAN, HAAS SCHOOL OF BUS., U.C.
BERKELEY, REPUTATION IN ONLINE MARKETS: SOME NEGATIVE FEEDBACK (2006),
http://faculty.haas.ber keley.edu/rjmorgan/reputation%20in%20online%20markets.pdf [http
s://perma.cc/RK5F-5N 6J]; see also Daniel Roberts, Yelp’s Fake Review Problem, FORTUNE
(Sept. 26, 2013, 3:05 PM), http://fortune.com/2013/09/26/yelps-fake-review-problem [http
s://perma.cc/82RL-V8 S9]; Brent Underwood, Behind the Scam: What Does It Take to Be a
‘Best-Selling Author’? $3 and 5 Minutes, OBSERVER (Feb. 23, 2016, 10:00 AM),
http://observer.com/2016/02/behind-the-scam-what-does-it-takes-to-be-a-bestselling-author3-and-5-minutes [https://perma.cc/V B32-XF35].
131

Fall 2016]

THE BRIDGING MODEL

159

play F because she believes that R expects her to. . . . In sum, a trustee is trust
responsive if an increase in f** tends to bring about an increase in f.137

Got that? All this is to say that when a parent tells a child, “I’m trusting
you to . . .” and the child believes them and behaves better, the child is considered “trust responsive.”138
The flow-chart models are perhaps more accessible. The flow charts
demonstrate how variables and behaviors build upon and influence each other,
moving through “trust” (usually the centerpiece) towards ultimate behaviors.
For example, Morgan and Hunt (Fig. 1) theorize that in order to develop longterm relationships between customers and businesses, the parties must have
shared values and prompt, honest communication.139 These, plus an avoidance
of opportunistic behavior, build trust.140 Trust, along with the acknowledgement
of relationship benefits (plus higher relationship termination costs), leads to a
relationship commitment.141 Relationship commitment, again along with trust,
leads to parties’ acquiescence, cooperation, and “functional” conflict, while reducing uncertainty and propensity to leave the relationship.142
FIGURE 1: MORGAN AND HUNT MODEL: RELATIONSHIP COMMITMENT AND TRUST

137

BACHARACH ET AL., supra note 117, at 6.
Id. For more on trust reciprocity, see Malhotra, supra note 113, at 62–64; see also Madan
M. Pillutla et al., Attributions of Trust and the Calculus of Reciprocity, 39 J. EXPERIMENTAL
PSYCHOL. 448 (2003).
139
Robert M. Morgan & Shelby D. Hunt, The Commitment-Trust Theory of Relationship
Marketing, 58 J. MARKETING 20, 22 (1994).
140
Id.
141
Id.
142
Id.
138
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Mukherjee and Nath have written multiple papers building on the Morgan
and Hunt model. In 2003, they analyzed trust-building and relationship marketing in the online banking context, proposing a slimmed-down version of the
Morgan and Hunt model (Fig. 2).143 In this model, they determine that shared
values, good communication, and avoidance of opportunistic behavior build
trust, and that trust (along with shared values) leads to relationship commitment:144
FIGURE 2: MUKHERJEE AND NATH TRUST-BUILDING MODEL

In 2007, Mukherjee and Nath analyzed relationship marketing in online retailing more broadly. Their 2007 model (Fig. 3) expands the streamlined 2003
version, introducing privacy and security as variables in trust-building and adding relationship benefits and termination costs into the formation of relationship
commitment.145 They also expand the end-product of the model, reincorporating the Morgan and Hunt conceptualization of relationship commitment as a
waystation toward behavior, rather than an end in and of itself:146

143

Avinandan Mukherjee & Prithwiraj Nath, A Model of Trust in Online Relationship Banking, 21 INT’L J. BANK MARKETING 5, 9 (2003).
144
Id.
145
Mukherjee & Nath, supra note 115, at 1183.
146
Id.
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FIGURE 3: MUKHERJEE AND NATH RELATIONSHIP MARKETING MODEL

These models offer qualitative analysis of the factors that build trust in an
individual party and how that trust manifests itself in business decisions. Missing from these models is the legal component—the enforcement mechanisms
that exist, in part, to remove the need for trust.
Some social-science work assumes that the mere existence of a legal
framework supplants the need for trust, suggesting that trust is necessary only
where legal mechanisms are absent.147 As any lawyer knows, however, the
mere existence of a legal system is a far cry from certainty of outcome—
contract enforcement via litigation is full of risks and unknowns, and even if a
judgment is obtained, it may not be collectible.
To understand better how enforcement mechanisms interact with trust in
contract formation, then, a more sensitive model is necessary.
B.

Proposed Model: Bridging

This paper proposes a new conceptualization of trust, with particular implications for business and law. The model begins with the premise that there is a
distance between wanting to do something and doing (or committing to doing)
it; this distance represents the uncertainty of the performance occurring. One
party is interested in entering into a transaction or contract but is uncertain
whether the other party will perform adequately. This uncertainty, visualized
here as a distance, must be overcome before the parties actually enter into the
transaction or contract (Fig. 4).

147

E.g., Jones et al., supra note 112, at 83–84; FEHR, supra note 114, at 3.
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FIGURE 4: UNCERTAINTY DISTANCE

The uncertainty distance may also be characterized as the party’s reluctance to enter into the transaction or contract. Only by overcoming this reluctance will the parties enter into the transaction or contract.
There is no attempt here to quantify the uncertainty distance. For a particularly risk-averse actor, the uncertainty distance may be wide; for a risk-tolerant
actor, or for someone who is simply unconcerned with possible negative repercussions, the uncertainty distance may be minimal.
Whatever its size, the distance between wanting to transact and actually
transacting is overcome by a combination of two things: trust and enforcement
mechanisms. The more absent or vaguer the enforcement mechanisms, the
more trust is necessary to bridge the uncertainty distance and for the parties to
enter into the transaction (Fig. 5), and vice versa: the more reliable the enforcement mechanism, the less trust is necessary (Fig. 6).
FIGURE 5: WEAK ENFORCEMENT/HIGH TRUST: DISTANCE BRIDGED

FIGURE 6: STRONG ENFORCEMENT/LOW TRUST: DISTANCE BRIDGED
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It is also possible that a proposed transaction or contract will not have
enough enforcement potential or trust to effectively bridge the uncertainty distance (Fig. 7). In such a situation, the parties would not bridge the uncertainty
distance, and no transaction or contract would result:
FIGURE 7: LOW ENFORCEMENT/LOW TRUST: DISTANCE NOT BRIDGED

Importantly, the word enforcement is not used here in the sense that parties
will be forced to perform under the contract. Rather, enforcement here refers to
any mechanism that will make an aggrieved party whole in the event of breach
or other violation. Enforcement mechanisms eliminate party risk; they may do
so by requiring specific performance or the payment of damages by the counterparty, or they may be third-party reassurance, such as insurance providers.
Enforcement mechanisms may be broadly understood.148 They may be
formal, public affairs such as litigation to compel specific performance or assess money damages. Enforcement may also be informal or semiformal, private
or semiprivate. Social norms149 and relationship pressures can serve as informal
enforcement mechanisms,150 though they may be as public or as private as the
enforcer effectuates—public shaming of a counterparty may be a very effective
enforcement mechanism, though not necessarily a relationship-building one.
Alternative dispute resolution, trade association governance, and network governance may be considered “semiformal” enforcement, in that third-party adjudication may be present (though not by a formal court).151 Trade association
148

The bridging model may encompass, but does not require, distinctions between types of
enforcement mechanisms. For more on differentiation between enforcement mechanisms,
see e.g., Barak D. Richman, Firms, Courts, and Reputation Mechanisms: Towards a Positive
Theory of Private Ordering, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 2328 (2004) (proposing a model to distinguish between firm-based, court-based, and reputation-based enforcement mechanisms, and
to predict when each type of mechanism will be utilized).
149
See generally ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW NEIGHBORS SETTLE
DISPUTES 123–264 (1991) (exploring the development of behavioral norms and social order
among cattle ranchers in Shasta County, California, irrespective of existing legal and market
mechanisms).
150
Ronald J. Gilson et al., Braiding: The Interaction of Formal and Informal Contracting in
Theory, Practice, and Doctrine, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1377, 1378–80 (2010).
151
See Lisa Bernstein, Beyond Relational Contracts: Social Capital and Network Governance in Procurement Contracts, 7 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 561, 562 (2015); see also CHARLES
FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE: A THEORY OF CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATION 21–27 (1981).
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governance and network governance may be considered “semiprivate” as well,
in that industry players may be informed of adjudications and enforcement, but
the general public is not. Insurance may also provide a kind of enforcement
mechanism, assuring parties that they will be made whole (if not by their counterparties) in the event of nonperformance.
Whatever form enforcement may take, it may be understood as an exogenous force on the party’s ability to bridge the uncertainty distance. The party
does not exert control over the formation or existence of the enforcement
mechanism. Trust, on the other hand, is endogenous, in that it comes from
within the trusting party.152
Current legal theory in trust and contracts can be incorporated and understood through this bridging model. Professor Fried, for instance, has explored
whether contractual obligations exist because of external pressures on parties or
because of internal, moral principles that compel performance of a promise.153
Professor Fried’s emphasis on the moral basis for contract law does not appear
in the bridging model, but the tension of whether contracts are performed in response to internal or external forces is neatly incorporated: both external enforcement mechanisms and internal trust contribute to overcoming the uncertainty distance.
More recently, Professor Bernstein explores governance of master supply
agreements between original equipment manufacturers, suggesting that interreliant firms in a given industry can, via procurement contracts, turn over the
governance and enforcement of these agreements to a trade association or other
form of social governance.154 Likewise, Professor Richman has explored community institutions among ultra-Orthodox Jews that generate specific economic
efficiencies in the diamond industry beyond what could be expected using public courts and contract law doctrines.155 These industry-specific examples can
be understood in the bridging model as specialized or additional kinds of enforcement mechanisms that reduce the amount of trust necessary to bridge the
uncertainty distance between wanting to transact and actually transacting.
In a series of papers, Professors Gilson, Sable, and Scott explore contracts
for innovation, or contracts between component manufacturers who are work-

152

Malhotra and Murninghan also characterize trust as internal, while contract (an enforcement mechanism) is an external behavioral control. Deepak Malhotra & J. Keith Murnighan,
The Effects of Contracts on Interpersonal Trust, 47 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 534, 536 (2002).
153
See FRIED, supra note 151, at 5.
154
See generally Bernstein, supra note 151.
155
Barak D. Richman, How Community Institutions Create Economic Advantage: Jewish
Diamond Merchants in New York, 31 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 383 (2006); see also Barak D.
Richman, Ethnic Networks, Extralegal Certainty, and Globalisation: Peering into the Diamond Industry, in LEGAL CERTAINTY BEYOND THE STATE 31, 35 (Volkmar Gessner ed.,
2009); Lisa Bernstein, Opting Out of the Legal System: Extralegal Contractual Relations in
the Diamond Industry, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 115, 115 (1992).
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ing to develop cutting-edge technologies.156 These contracts fascinate because
the parties do not know at the outset what specifications, or even what products, are going to be produced; rather, the contracts are carefully designed to set
out each party’s responsibilities in an ongoing collaboration toward something
inarticulable.157 Gilson, Sable, and Scott propose that these contracts “braid”
formal and informal enforcement mechanisms together, which in turn builds
trust between the parties158—this process is in lieu of parties establishing trust
first, then agreeing to these difficult-to-articulate contractual arrangements.
The proposed model from this paper would incorporate the “braiding” concept differently, suggesting that braided enforcement mechanisms together increase overall enforcement capacity and reduce the amount of trust necessary to
bridge the distance between wanting to transact and actually doing so.
The bridging model assumes a fixed uncertainty distance for any given
transaction, so that building additional trust—while pleasant—is not necessary
once the uncertainty distance is bridged. Put another way, superfluous trust is
nice but not necessary. Increasing amounts of trust over time do not cause the
enforcement mechanisms to shrink or the uncertainty distance to change. Rather, enforcement exists as an exogenous force on transaction formation, and it
is not forced to constrict as trust expands.
It is also possible that as the relationship between two parties continues, the
balance between enforcement and trust may shift. Parties may begin their relationship with one combination of enforcement reliance and trust, but enforcement mechanisms may become more or less reliable over time. For instance,
Bernstein posits that trade associations and network governance can be effective;159 the effectiveness of these mechanisms may change as industries develop. A nascent industry may have weak (or untested) enforcement mechanisms,
but as the industry matures and grows, trade associations and networks may
self-reinforce. The opposite is also true: a dying industry may have enforcement mechanisms with ever-dwindling authority. In either case, as the efficacy
of the enforcement mechanism changes, the amount of trust necessary to bridge
the uncertainty distance would also change. Of note, a dwindling enforcement
mechanism and a lack of trust between parties may well mean that the uncertainty distance is no longer bridged, and transactions will cease.

156

See Ronald J. Gilson et al., Contracting for Innovation: Vertical Disintegration and Interfirm Collaboration, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 431, 434–35 (2009) [hereinafter Contracting for
Innovation]. See generally Gilson et al., supra note 150; Ronald J. Gilson et al., Contract
and Innovation: The Limited Role of Generalist Courts in the Evolution of Novel Contractual Forms, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 170 (2013); Ronald J. Gilson et al., Text and Context: Contract
Interpretation as Contract Design, 100 CORNELL L. REV. 23 (2014); Ronald J. Gilson et al.,
Contract, Uncertainty and Innovation (Colum. Law Sch. Law & Econ. Paper Series, Working Paper No. 385, 2011).
157
Contracting for Innovation, supra note 152, at 449.
158
Gilson et al., supra note 150, at 1384.
159
See Bernstein, supra note 151, at 562.
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The model does not suggest what balance of enforcement and trust is optimal. While it may seem at first blush that an entirely enforcement-based bridge
is preferable, the analysis in Part V, below, suggests that the incorporation of at
least some trust is inevitable—even beneficial.160
Information exchange can expand the quantity of both enforcement reliance and trust. Parties that are better informed about available enforcement
mechanisms (formal or otherwise) will generally perceive expanded enforcement capabilities, and as parties learn more about each other (values and interests, history of past dealings, etc.) they will have the opportunity to build more
trust between them.
The proposed model may undoubtedly be improved. The model, for instance, does not currently suggest what creates the trust that contributes to
bridging the uncertainty distance. This vacuum is a departure from the socialscience research summarized above, which does focus on variables and behaviors that affect trust formation.161 The role of information sharing, especially
online, including reputation formation and interpretation, might be explored.
Future work may also consider additional forms of enforcement mechanisms
that increase the amount of certainty in a transaction and thereby reduce the
amount of trust necessary to bridge the distance between wanting to enter a
transaction and actually doing so.
IV. THE BRIDGING MODEL APPLIED TO TRADITIONAL BANKING
As an illustration of the bridging model in application, this Part applies the
model to traditional banking, understood roughly here to mean the brick-andmortar U.S. banking system of the past hundred years or so.
A. Currency and the Money Supply
Traditional banking relies on money, as opposed to relying on a barter system.162 Currency has three characteristics: it is a unit of account, a store of value, and a medium of exchange.163
160

Relatedly, Professor Malhotra has suggested that overly complex or incentive-based contacts can be perceived as insulting, and that the proposal or presence of such contracts can
actually erode preexisting trust between the parties. Deepak Malhotra, When Contracts Destroy Trust, HARV. BUS. REV., May 2009, at 25.
161
In exploring this question, the work of Shapiro, Sheppard, and Cheraskin (1992) may be
useful, which suggests “three broad categories (or typologies) of trust: deterrence-based
trust, knowledge-based trust, and identification-based trust.” Malhotra, supra note 113, at 61.
162
Some sources distinguish between money and currency—money is an idea, while currency is the physical representation of value. See Ralph E. McKinney, Jr. et al., The Evolution of
Financial Instruments and the Legal Protection Against Counterfeiting: A Look at Coin, Paper, and Virtual Currencies, 2015 U. ILL. J. L. TECH. & POL’Y 273, 277 (2015). The distinction is not important for the purposes of this Article, and the terms will be used interchangeably here.
163
Angela Walch, The Bitcoin Blockchain as Financial Market Infrastructure: A Consideration of Operational Risk, 18 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 837, 848–49 (2015).
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A unit of account is simply a way of quantifying how many of one thing
equals how many of another. It’s a way of measuring value against a consistent
standard. Anything can be a unit of account,164 but in the United States we
measure value in dollars and cents. Dollars and cents can, in turn, be valued in
other currencies—at the time of this writing, for instance, one U.S. dollar is
worth about 0.91 Euros, 6.52 Chinese yuan, 3,309 Colombian pesos, and 0.30
Kuwaiti dinar.165
Currency is a store of value when its value is relatively consistent.166 This
ensures the buying power of a unit of currency today is about the same as it will
be tomorrow, making the currency a good vehicle for savings. If the value of a
currency were unpredictable and unstable, people would tend to spend all the
money they obtain, because they can’t be sure how much it will buy in the future.
Money serves as a medium of exchange because all goods and services in
the economy can be reduced to their price and can be exchanged for that universally accepted item, currency.167 This allows people to trade without bartering and facilitates price comparison.168
A functional currency requires a tremendous amount of trust by an entire
society. This is true whether the currency is “fiat” (government-issued) or “specie” (tied to the value of some other precious commodity, such as gold or silver).169 Specie currencies are presumed to be inherently valuable, while fiat currencies are valuable because they are backed by a government, making them
legal tender for paying debts.170
The U.S. dollar is a functional medium of exchange because people agree
to express their offered goods and services in dollar-denominated prices and
agree to accept dollars in exchange for those goods and services.171 It is a store
of value because its value is relatively consistent, and people trust that their
savings of U.S. dollars will generally hold value over time.
The dollar is “backed” by the government, which does not mean that dollars can be taken to the steps of the Federal Reserve and exchanged for anything (such as gold). It does mean, however, that the U.S. government takes responsibility for managing the supply of money, in terms of both the physical
164

See Golumbia, supra note 78, at 118; see also Sesame Street (PBS television broadcast
Dec. 15, 2011) (Drew Brees measures Elmo’s height in inches (24), potatoes (4), tubes of
toothpaste (3), and footballs (3)).
165
Exchange Rates: New York Closing Snapshot, WALL ST. J., (Feb. 23, 2016),
http://www.wsj.com/mdc/public/page/2_3021-forex-20160223.html?mod=mdc_pastcalendar
[https://perma.cc/83ZL-PA6A].
166
See Walch, supra note 163, at 848–49.
167
See Becker et al., supra note 31, at 2.
168
Money, THISMATTER, http://thismatter.com/money/banking/money.htm [https://perma.c
c/TYF7-US4L] (last visited Aug. 31, 2016).
169
See, e.g., Grinberg, supra note 11, at 173.
170
Id.
171
See, e.g., McKinney, supra note 162, at 275.
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bills in circulation and the total money supply.172 As with all things, the value
of a dollar is connected to its scarcity,173 and the number of dollars in circulation is carefully monitored and managed by the federal government.174
Using the bridging model, the use of currency in a society can be expressed
in this way: the uncertainty distance between wanting to transact in U.S. dollars
and actually doing so is bridged by a combination of (1) enforcement, in the
form of government backing, and (2) trust. Unpacking this a bit further, however, reveals that government “backing” may not be the lock-step enforcement
mechanism many assume.
Certainly, the federal government has a monopoly on the printing and distribution of physical dollar bills.175 The Constitution grants Congress alone the
power to coin money,176 and this process is monopolized by the Department of
the Treasury.177 Federal law establishes U.S. coins and currency as legal tender.178 To maintain the value of the currency, counterfeiting is a federal
crime,179 and the Secret Service is tremendously efficient at stamping out counterfeiting.180
The management of the intangible money supply is handled by the Federal
Reserve (“the Fed”). The Fed uses three main tools here.181 First, the Fed sets
the discount rate, the interest rate at which the Fed lends money to other banks,
which then has a spillover effect on the interest rates those banks charge customers and each other.182 Higher interest rates generally encourage saving and
172

See, e.g., Money, FED. RESERVE BANK DALL. (Sept. 2013), https://www.dallasfed.org/as
sets/documents/educate/everyday/money.pdf [https://perma.cc/J2ZR-253G].
173
See Becker et al., supra note 31, at 2.
174
See infra Part IV.A.
175
Most of us take paper dollars for granted, but the transition from coin to paper was a
dramatic Constitutional question in the latter half of the nineteenth century. See generally
James B. Thayer, Legal Tender, 1 HARV. L. REV. 73 (1887).
176
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 5. The very next clause authorizes Congress to punish counterfeiting. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 6. The states are expressly forbidden to coin money. U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1.
177
31 U.S.C. §§ 301–304 (2012). Section 301 establishes the Department of the Treasury,
section 302 identifies the Department of the Treasury as the Treasury of the United States.
Section 303 establishes the Bureau of Engraving and Printing (which produces paper currency), and section 304 establishes the United States Mint (which produces coins). Id.
178
31 U.S.C. § 5103 (2012). See also Julliard v. Greenman (The Legal Tender Cases), 110
U.S. 421 (1884).
179
18 U.S.C. §§ 472–473 (2012).
180
JASON KERSTEN, THE ART OF MAKING MONEY: THE STORY OF A MASTER COUNTERFEITER
56–57 (2009).
181
The three tools outlined here are the traditional ones. During times of crisis, the Fed may
engage—and has, historically—in additional economic management tools, e.g. qualitative
easing. See Tracy Alloway & Luke Kawa, Say Goodbye to the Fed You Once Knew, FORBES
(Apr. 14, 2016), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-04-14/say-goodbye-to-thefed- you-once-knew [https://perma.cc/B8YN-ZU79].
182
Kathryn Reed Edge, Bank on It: Interest Rates 101, TENN. B. J., Aug. 2015, at 32, 33;
About the Federal Open Market Committee, BD. GOVERNORS FED. RESERVE SYS., http://
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discourage borrowing, thereby decreasing lending and the overall money supply.183 Second, the Fed conducts open-market operations, either buying or selling securities to expand or contract the amount of money in general circulation.184 When the Fed buys securities, it collects those securities from the public
sphere and replaces them with dollars, expanding the money supply. When the
Fed sells securities, the money supply contracts because the Fed is collecting
dollars from other economic actors and replacing those dollars with less liquid
securities. Third, the Fed, as a banking regulator, can adjust the reserve requirement, or the amount of deposits the banks are required to keep.185 A reserve requirement of 10 percent means that $90 of every $100 can be lent out; a
reserve requirement of 12 percent means that only $88 of every $100 can be
lent. Increasing the reserve requirement thus decreases the money supply.
Managing the money supply steadies a currency’s value; the invention of
central banking demonstrably reduced the volatility of currencies and the depth
of economic shocks.186 Most economists agree that central bank management of
the money supply is a social good.187
This management of the money supply is a form of enforcement, in that it
is an exogenous force reassuring users that the vehicle is safe and reliable. To
be sure, money supply management it is not automatic. Whereas Bitcoin’s algorithm automatically adjusts its difficulty to ensure that production of bitcoins
happens consistently every ten minutes,188 the supply of U.S. dollars is tracked
by the Fed and small adjustments are made as the Boards of Governors or the
Federal Open Market Committee see fit.189 This method is, of course, not perfectly reliable. The Fed is made up of people, who sometimes make mistakes.
They’re trying their best, but they’re imperfect. This decreases the impact of
the enforcement portion of the bridge, requiring more trust.
Nearly everyone in America uses dollars, even those who refuse to use
banks.190 This suggests that whatever deficiencies may exist in the enforcement
mechanisms behind the currency, there is enough trust among Americans to
www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/fomc.htm [https://perma.cc/3ULA-PGHC] (last
visited Aug. 15, 2016).
183
See PETER CONTI-BROWN, THE POWER AND INDEPENDENCE OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE 54–
55 (2016).
184
12 U.S.C. § 353 (2012); see also Mark F. Bernstein, Note, The Federal Open Market
Committee and the Sharing of Governmental Power with Private Citizens, 75 VA. L. REV.
111, 114–18 (1989).
185
12 U.S.C. § 461 (2012).
186
BERNARD SHULL, THE FOURTH BRANCH: THE FEDERAL RESERVE’S UNLIKELY RISE TO
POWER AND INFLUENCE 36–40, 60–61 (2005).
187
Grinberg, supra note 11, at 173 n.64; Golumbia, supra note 78, at 124.
188
ANTONOPOULOS, supra note 24, at 25–26.
189
E.g., Jeff Cox, Fed Raises Rates by 25 Basis Points, First Since 2006, CNBC (Dec. 16,
2015, 2:41 PM), http://www.cnbc.com/2015/12/16/fed-raises-rates-for-first-time-since-200
6.html [https://perma.cc/F9K6-P8PU].
190
Grinberg, supra note 11, at 172–73; POPPER, supra note 8, at 16 (“The essential quality
of successful money . . . [is] the number of people willing to use it.”).
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overcome the uncertainty distance and use dollars for daily transactions. Unless, of course, people use dollars out of inertia or ignorance—the dollar has
been strong and reliable for most Americans’ lifetimes, and some people may
have never paused to wonder why they use dollars or whether there are other
options (Americans have short memories191). On the other hand, in countries
where the fiat currency is unreliable and untrustworthy, people do move away
from using it.192
B. Deposits and Lending
A traditional bank, at its most basic function, takes deposits and makes
loans. Why is it we’re willing to deposit money with a bank? We certainly
wouldn’t do such a thing with strangers—hand them a wad of cash and say,
“Hang on to this for me, but give it back when I ask.” Why would a person
want to hand over their savings to a bank, on the bank’s mere promise that he
or she could withdraw the money again later?
Banks are physically safer than keeping funds at home, provide deposit
customers with cheap and reliable payment systems, and ideally pay interest on
deposited funds.193 Much of a bank’s business, however, is shrouded in secrecy.
Banks keep customer information private, so much information is kept where it
cannot be verified by anyone other than regulators. Banks keep their private
ledgers regarding customer information, and central banks keep ledgers of individual banks’ accounts.194 This is good for individual privacy, but bad in the
sense that opacity can enable bad business practices and fail to find or prevent
mistakes.
What allows a depositor to overcome the uncertainty that deposited funds
can be withdrawn again? A combination of exogenous enforcement mechanisms and endogenous trust. Enforcement comes, most obviously, from the insurance provided by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (“FDIC”) that
covers most funds on deposit with banks. A second type of enforcement comes
from governmental regulation of banks.

191

The English comedian Eddie Izzard has told audiences,
I grew up in Europe, where the history comes from. . . . You tear your history down, man. ‘It’s
thirty years old, let’s smash it and put a car park here.’ I have seen it in stories. I saw . . . something in Miami. ‘We’ve redecorated this building to how it looked over fifty years ago.’ People
are going, ‘No, surely not! No! No one was alive then.’

EDDIE IZZARD: DRESS TO KILL (Ella Communications Ltd. 1999).
192
See VIGNA & CASEY, supra note 10, at 17–21, 208–10 (discussing Argentina’s currency
crises and public affinity for alternative financial service providers and Bitcoin).
193
Catherine Martin Christopher, Mobile Banking: The Answer for the Unbanked in America?, 65 CATH. U. L. REV. 221, 226–30 (2015).
194
See 12 U.S.C. § 3403 (2012); 12 C.F.R. § 204.5 (2012).
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The FDIC insures funds on deposit; that is, if the bank fails and is unable to
repay its depositors, the FDIC will do so, within the statutory caps.195 This system has been in place since 1933 and remains “the cornerstone on which American consumer confidence in its banking and financial system rests . . . .”196 Using the bridging model, this is an obvious enforcement mechanism—external
assurances that allow individuals to overcome their reluctance to place their
money with banks.197
In addition to deposit insurance, bank customers are protected by government regulation of banks.198 Every bank in the United States is “examined” on a
regular basis, during which exhaustive process the safety and soundness of the
bank is tested.199 Errors are corrected, changes are recommended, and (sometimes) punishments are imposed.200 The majority of commentators agree that
bank regulation is necessary,201 but it is far from perfect. Banks are subject to
examination by a convoluted web of government regulators,202 which results in
inefficiencies and inconsistencies across the industry.203 Moreover, the whims
of one individual examiner may have a disproportionate effect on an individual
firm.204
So, while deposit insurance and bank regulation provide external reassurances to bank customers that the bank is safe to do business with,205 these enforcement mechanisms are not perfect. FDIC insurance is not unlimited, and
bank examination—like insurance rate management—is performed by fallible
195
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humans. While would-be banking customers may bridge their uncertainty distances partially with the knowledge and understanding of available enforcement mechanisms, the remainder of that distance must be bridged by the customer’s trust in the bank.
These are but a few examples of the balance of enforcement and trust that
exist within the traditional banking industry. More work can certainly be done
in applying the bridging model to more complex banking and shadow-banking
activities.
Those who would like to enter the banking system but have not yet done so
must bridge their uncertainty distance with a combination of enforcement and
trust: enforcement exists in the imperfect forms of money supply management
and bank regulation, both primarily via the Fed. These enforcement mechanisms are not perfectly robust, however, and the remainder of the uncertainty
distance must be bridged with user trust.
Bitcoin proponents, by contrast, argue that Bitcoin is a trustless system,
and that such a system is superior to the traditional-yet-flawed U.S. banking
system. The next Part addresses these issues.
V. THE BRIDGING MODEL APPLIED TO BITCOIN AND THE BLOCKCHAIN
Advocates trumpet the “trustlessness” of Bitcoin and the blockchain as one
of the system’s core virtues.206 But Bitcoin and the blockchain are not really
trustless. And that’s a good thing. The bridging model is useful in understanding the issues at play.
A. Bitcoin as Currency
As a currency, Bitcoin is said to be trustless because the money supply is
predetermined. Bitcoins are produced at a predictable rate, with a maximum
number pre-established.207 Bitcoins cannot be double-spent, meaning each existing coin is only in one place at one time.208 Contrast this with the money
supply in traditional banking, in which the Bureau of Printing and Engraving
can increase the physical supply of currency, and the Fed can manipulate the
intangible money supply by altering interest rates, engaging in open-market operations, and changing the reserve requirement.209 With Bitcoin, on the other
hand, there are no central bankers making such decisions.
Applying the bridging model to this narrative, it would appear that those
who use Bitcoin as a currency rely entirely on its exogenous enforcement
206
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mechanism—predetermined currency production—to bridge the uncertainty
distance. This is not enforcement in the sense that government backing or management supports the currency, obviously, but in the sense that the Bitcoin protocol is entirely self-enforcing. Computer programming is the most mechanical
of mechanisms: If X, then Y, no questions asked.210 If Bitcoin is entirely enforcement, then, no trust is necessary (once the user is well-enough informed to
understand the mechanics of the enforcement).
All currency, however, requires trust—trust that others are willing to accept that currency in exchange for goods and services.211 Moreover, all currencies require trust in the origin source; with Bitcoin, that trust is placed in the
code and the encryption process.212 These are publicly available in a way that
traditional banking methods aren’t,213 but transparency isn’t everything. The
majority of the population doesn’t have the computer literacy to understand the
code and verify that it’s good. Those people are simply trusting that the programmers (from Nakamoto onward) have done the right thing.
The fixed and regular supply of bitcoins, together with their inability to be
double-spent, hearkens to the appeal of gold as a currency214—scarcity creates
value.215 However, here’s the bombshell that doesn’t get much attention: since
Bitcoin is a computer program, the maximum number of bitcoins, and the rate
at which they are mined, can be changed.216
Increasing (or decreasing) the maximum number of bitcoins in circulation
is not a common or even popular suggestion, but it is possible. The core developers have the ability to make this change, though they would admittedly have
to convince 51 percent of the Bitcoin network to adopt the updated version of
the software that contains the modification.
Making significant changes to the Bitcoin software is not without precedent, but it is also not without controversy. For instance, since Bitcoin’s inception, each transaction block in the blockchain has been limited to one megabyte
in size.217 By early 2016, however, so many transactions were taking place at
any one time that a single block wasn’t big enough to process them all, threatening delays in the peer-to-peer settlement.218 The debate over whether to re210

See SZABO, Smart Contracts, supra note 98.
See POPPER, supra note 8, at 55.
212
Id.
213
Id.
214
Sarah Gruber, Note, Trust, Identity, and Disclosure: Are Bitcoin Exchanges the Next Virtual Havens for Money Laundering and Tax Evasion?, 32 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 135, 150
(2013).
215
Grinberg, supra note 11, at 168; see also Gruber, supra note 214, at 150 n.90.
216
See Grinberg, supra note 11, at 175 n.71.
217
Paul Vigna, Bitcoin Developer Cites Community Rift in His Exit, WALL ST. J., Jan. 19,
2016, at C6.
218
One of Bitcoin’s benefits over traditional banking is the close-to-real-time settlement,
compared to overnight settlement in traditional banking. See Vivek Wadhwa, R.I.P. Bitcoin.
It’s Time to Move On., WASH. POST (Jan. 19, 2016), https://www.washington
211

174

NEVADA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 17:139

vise the Bitcoin code to increase the block size caused huge controversy within
the community, largely because it would change the incentive system for miners.219 One of the most prominent Bitcoin proponents even sold his bitcoins and
quit the community over the drama.220 If a proposal to change the block size
can cause such disruption, surely a proposal to increase or decrease the maximum number of bitcoins would, too. It remains, however, technically possible.221
The fact that the maximum number of bitcoins can be changed decreases
the power of the enforcement mechanism in the bridging model as applied to
Bitcoin. Bitcoin isn’t completely trustless—trust must be placed in the core developers and the network as a whole to adopt useful and appropriate modifications to the code as necessary.
Because the exogenous enforcement mechanism isn’t perfect, some trust
must exist to bridge the uncertainty distance between wanting to use Bitcoin
and actually doing so. Or, put another way, individuals relying on the enforcement mechanism to keep bitcoins’ value stable are not fully informed.
Moreover, central bank management of currency is generally presumed to
be a good thing.222 Yes, central bankers are fallible, but a flexible money supply
helps control inflation and deflation, which can be destabilizing in an economy.
Inflation occurs when the supply of money outpaces the demand for it; if salaries go up, prices must also rise to appropriately ration or distribute goods and
services among increasing numbers of potential buyers.223 Deflation occurs
when the money supply is too small, and prices must shrink because too few
market participants have enough money to purchase available goods and services.224 The Fed monitors all of these factors and tweaks its monetary policy
accordingly.
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As the code is currently written, bitcoins will cease to be produced once 21
million have been mined.225 It is possible that once this cap is reached, there
will not be enough bitcoins in circulation for each user to buy what they want.
If this happens, the natural result will be deflation: prices will shrink to the
point at which inventory can be sold to an appropriate number of buyers.
Bitcoins are divisible to the eighth decimal place, so increasingly small transactions are certainly possible.226 Shrinking prices, however, encourage hoarding.227 If one bitcoin buys a pair of shoes today, but prices are decreasing, then
that same bitcoin may buy two pairs of shoes next month. The rational economic actor would then delay purchasing, which, in the aggregate, causes the economy to sputter.
For this reason, a flexible money supply is actually an economic boon. This
suggests that Bitcoin-as-currency, analyzed via the bridging model, may be too
enforcement-heavy to the extent that the maximum number of bitcoins is rigidly set. A more significant component of trust here may actually be the preferable method by which to bridge the uncertainty distance: incorporating more
trust-based human flexibility to manage the supply and value of bitcoins would
actually make Bitcoin a more functional currency.
B.

Bitcoin as Payment System, Blockchain as Recordkeeper

As a payment system, the decentralized blockchain also operates by computational certainty. Transactions are made by users and confirmed by the network, which verifies that the sender owned the bitcoins and updates the ledger
to reflect that the bitcoins are now in the recipient’s wallet.228 Here again, using
the bridging model, the uncertainty distance between wanting to utilize the
Bitcoin payment system and actually doing so would appear to be bridged entirely by the enforcement-based software mechanism.
Because there is no centralized recordkeeper, the Bitcoin protocol prohibits
charge-backs, which further supports the entirely enforcement-based payment
mechanism. Nakamoto wrote, “With the possibility of reversal, the need for
trust spreads[,]” in apparent disparagement of trust.229 This thinking directly informs the design of the blockchain: verification by consensus (rather than by
trusted intermediary) by a method that cannot be undone.
However, a certain component of trust in a payment system may be desirable. A centralized, trusted recordkeeper can be appealed to in case of error.
Fraudulent credit card charges, for instance, can be disputed, and such systems
225
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are in place to prevent individual users from being the victims of theft or fraud.
With Bitcoin, however, there’s no one to complain to if a Bitcoin user sends
bitcoins to the wrong address, or if bitcoins are stolen by a hacker. Such mistakes or thefts are irreversible, unless the recipient (who is functionally anonymous) voluntarily returns them.
The lack of central recordkeeping also means that if a user loses their
password, there’s no one to ask for retrieval. One of the more delightful ironies
of the Bitcoin economy is that the best advice for keeping your password safe is
to write it down on a piece of paper and keep that paper in a safe place.230
Attacking the blockchain would be extremely difficult, since it would require marshalling at least 51 percent more computing power than the network
already encompasses.231 Nakamoto was aware of this weakness, though he dismissed it on the grounds that the attacker would have no financial incentive to
do so: Nakamoto assumed an attacker would be attempting to steal bitcoins,
possibly by double-spending them.232 If such an attacker were to do so, the violation of the blockchain would eliminate its trustworthiness, causing the value
of all bitcoins (including those owned by the attacker) to plunge.233 Stealing
bitcoins for their value may not be an attacker’s goal, however: he, she, or they
may simply want to destroy Bitcoin, “as a form of terrorism.”234
Even with honest actors, blockchain snafus are possible. On March 11,
2013, an incompatibility between Bitcoin version 0.7 and the recently-released
version 0.8 caused a “hard fork,” in which the network computers running version 0.7 began processing a different block than the computers running 0.8.235
There were suddenly two different (and growing) versions of the ledger, which
in turn meant that neither was reliable.236 Programmers noticed the problem almost immediately, and core developer Gavin Andresen moved quickly to resolve the hard fork.237 He did so simply by asking nicely: He convinced mining
operation BTC Guild to revert its system to version 0.7.238 BTC Guild controlled enough computing power within the network to shift the majority consensus back to version 0.7, and the network as a whole disregarded the fork of
230
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the blockchain that had been begun to be generated by version 0.8.239 BTC
Guild lost money by abandoning the version 0.8 blockchain.240 Without certainty as to which blockchain was valid, however, its holdings—and everyone
else’s—would have become worthless.241 In another ironic instance, then, a bug
in the self-executing software caused a potentially catastrophic error in the system, which was corrected by the very human intervention Bitcoin was designed
to avoid.
Because of the theoretical possibility of the blockchain being violated by a
51 percent attack or by the more-likely occurrence of a hard fork, the blockchain is therefore not as inviolable as may be presumed. The enforcement
mechanism is not as robust as the popular narrative suggests, and some amount
of trust is still necessary for users to bridge the uncertainty distance and begin
using Bitcoin and the blockchain as a payment system. Indeed, given the possibility of errors or software bugs creating unpredictable problems in the blockchain, some measure of trust may actually be desirable.
C.

Third-Party Intermediaries

Because most people lack the computer literacy to participate directly in
the Bitcoin ecosystem, many Bitcoin participants use the services of third parties, who act as interfaces between the individual and Bitcoin.242 Engaging these services requires a tremendous amount of trust, because enforcement is quite
uncertain.243
Most third-party intermediaries in the Bitcoin ecosystem hold their customers’ bitcoins on their behalf—the individual customers are not reflected on
the blockchain, but the intermediary is.244 The customers thus have a contractu239
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al relationship with the intermediary,245 and to forge that relationship they must
overcome the uncertainty distance, not between themselves and Bitcoin, but between themselves and transacting with the intermediary.246
The bridge, if it is built, must consist almost entirely of trust, because enforcement mechanisms here are minimal. The intermediaries conduct their
business online, but are, in fact, located in jurisdictions all across the world.
Enforcing contract claims in that situation would be difficult, to say the least.247
Hackers steal bitcoins on a semi-regular basis. Numerous third-party intermediaries have been hacked, and customer bitcoins stolen: Bitcoin vendors
Bitstamp, Bitcoin Savings and Trust, Bitfloor, Instawallet, and others have all
been hacked, with hundreds of millions of dollars’ worth of bitcoins stolen.248
The most infamous of mismanaged and vulnerable intermediaries was Mt. Gox,
which at one point processed nearly 80 percent of all Bitcoin transactions globally.249 Red flags abounded for years, but the company finally collapsed after
admitting in February, 2014, that 850,000 bitcoins were gone, valued at about
half a billion dollars.250 The company filed bankruptcy in Japan (and a related
proceeding in the United States),251 and about a quarter of the missing bitcoins
have been recovered so far.252
Thus, using a third-party intermediary requires a tremendous amount of
trust, since enforcement is nearly nonexistent.253 Because most people lack the
computer literacy to participate directly in Bitcoin, however, significant trust in
these third-party intermediaries is necessary for meaningful expansion of
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Bitcoin. Of course, Bitcoin was designed specifically to avoid the need for
trusted third-party intermediaries.254
D.

Government Enforcement?

Bitcoin has its own internal enforcement mechanisms written into the code,
but some would-be users may seek to rely on external enforcement mechanisms
to bridge the uncertainty distance. Although the bridging model can incorporate
a diverse definition of enforcement (network governance, public shaming, etc.),
this section explores whether governmental enforcement mechanisms are reliable in the Bitcoin context.
Within the United States, government regulation of Bitcoin is minimal.
This may make it a libertarian ideal, but it prevents would-be Bitcoin users
from being able to rely on external enforcement mechanisms. Several federal
agencies are exploring whether Bitcoin comes within their jurisdiction, but
their actions are uncoordinated.255 To the extent enforcement has been effective, it has been in the criminal context rather than the civil; various federal law
enforcement agencies have had significant success in shutting down Bitcoinrelated money laundering, drug dealing, and other criminal activities, but there
is precious little consumer protection regulation for Bitcoin users.256
This may be because we are not currently able to answer a surprisingly
basic question: What is a bitcoin? A robust debate is ongoing about whether
bitcoins are a currency, commodity, security, or property.257 If it’s a currency,
it’s a non-governmental one, and no government support can be expected,
though third-party intermediaries might conceivably be regulated under financial rules as money services businesses.258 If Bitcoin is a security or commodity, on the other hand, then enforcement lies with the Securities and Exchange
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Commission or the Commodity Futures Trading Commission.259 If it is property, as the IRS believes it is,260 then its ownership and transfer can theoretically
be enforced by a robust body of contract and property law. Until consensus
emerges, the governmental regulatory response to Bitcoin questions and challenges is likely to remain fractured.
This assumes, of course, the civil procedure hurdles can be overcome: determining where to file suit, identifying and serving a pseudonymous defendant, and determining what law applies to a potentially international transaction.261
CONCLUSION
Bitcoin has shaken up the way the world views money: it forces us to confront how comfortable we are with a financial system dependent on trusted intermediaries, and whether transparency and democracy are preferable to opacity when it comes to our financial health. But to call Bitcoin “trustless” is an
oversimplification. Although Bitcoin contains mechanisms that make it predictable and reliable—the regular production of bitcoins, the publicly verified
ledger—these mechanisms still rely on human involvement. Moreover, the
Bitcoin code may strip away instances where trust and human overrides are actually preferable, in that they allow considered responses to unanticipated problems.
The bridging model allows us to analyze the robustness of enforcement
mechanisms in bridging the uncertainty distance between wanting to transact
and transacting. It also allows us to articulate and analyze the interplay between
enforcement and trust. Particularly as additional blockchain applications are
explored, future work should critically analyze what roles enforcement and
trust should play in the legal and social spaces.
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